On the Genealogy of Morals is a polemic in three essays, written to expand ideas Nietzsche had sketched in Beyond Good and Evil. His target is the habit of treating moral values as self-evident and timeless. Against the English psychologists who explained morality through utility and forgetting, he proposes to dig for the real, documented history of how our valuations grew, and to ask the harder question of what those values are worth for human life.
The first essay separates two ways of ranking people. One pair, good and bad, came from the strong, who felt their own power and called it good, then called the low and common bad almost as an afterthought. The other pair, good and evil, came from the weak. Cut off from action, they took their revenge in imagination: they declared the powerful evil, and themselves, the suffering and meek, the only good. Nietzsche names the engine of this reversal ressentiment, a stored and creative resentment that produces values out of its own denial of what stands outside it.
The second essay turns to guilt and bad conscience. Nietzsche argues that the moral idea of ought descends from the material idea of owe, and that punishment began as repayment in pain within the relation of creditor and debtor, long before anyone asked whether the wrongdoer could have acted otherwise. Once humans were enclosed in society and could no longer discharge their wild instincts outward, those instincts turned back against the self. This internalization is the bad conscience, later deepened when the debt is owed to a god, until in Christianity guilt swells to a point that cannot be repaid.
The third essay asks what ascetic ideals mean, the ideals of poverty, chastity, and self-denial. Nietzsche finds them serving different purposes for artists, philosophers, and saints, but he fixes on the ascetic priest. The priest is the physician of a sick and resentful herd. He cannot cure the suffering, but he can change its direction, teaching the sufferer that the cause of pain lies within, in sin, so that the will to hurt is turned safely against the self under a religious sanction.
Nietzsche ends by arguing that the ascetic ideal won because nothing else offered an answer to the question of why we suffer. It gave suffering a meaning, even at the cost of poisoning life with guilt. He sees the same ideal hiding inside modern science and the will to truth, and he predicts that this truthfulness will eventually turn against the morality that bred it. The closing thought is stark: confronted with a void of meaning, the human will would rather aim at nothingness than cease to aim at all.