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Adam Smith argues that moral judgment grows from sympathy, the imagined view of an impartial spectator, and the inner conscience that learns to judge ourselves as others would.
Mind Map
Core Message
Smith opens not from selfishness but from sympathy: the capacity, through imagination, to enter another person's situation and feel a weaker version of what they feel. This shared sentiment is the raw material of every moral response.
An action or passion seems proper when a bystander can go along with it. We approve of others when we can sympathize with their sentiments, and we approve of ourselves when we imagine that an impartial onlooker could enter into our conduct.
Society is the mirror in which we first see our own character. Over time the outward judgment of others becomes an inner judge, the man within the breast, who corrects the distortions of self-love and calls us back to fairness.
Smith distinguishes the love of praise from the love of being praise-worthy. A good character is pleased with having done what merits approbation even when no one observes it, and is troubled by deserved blame that no one ever voices.
Summary
The Theory of Moral Sentiments is Adam Smith's account of where moral judgment comes from. Written before his work on economics, it sets aside the idea that ethics rests on cold calculation and begins instead with a fact of human nature: however selfish we may seem, we are interested in the fortunes of others and can feel sorrow at their sorrow and joy at their joy.
The engine of this fellow-feeling is the imagination. We have no direct experience of what another person feels, so we place ourselves in their situation, conceive what we ourselves would feel there, and form a weaker copy of their emotion. Smith calls this sympathy, and he extends the word beyond pity to cover fellow-feeling with any passion whatever. We approve of a person's response when, having brought their case home to ourselves, we find that our own sympathetic feeling matches theirs; this agreement is what he calls propriety.
Because approval depends on whether an onlooker can share a sentiment, Smith introduces the figure of the impartial spectator: a supposed equitable judge, fully informed and unbiased, whose view we try to take. Propriety is conduct this spectator could enter into; merit and demerit are judged by the gratitude or resentment such a spectator would feel. The spectator is not any actual crowd but an idealized standpoint that corrects for ignorance and partiality.
Smith then turns the spectator inward to explain conscience. A person raised in total solitude, he argues, could no more judge the beauty or deformity of their own mind than of their own face, having no mirror for it. Society supplies that mirror, and from the habit of being judged we build an internal judge, the man within the breast, who weighs our conduct as an impartial observer would. This inner spectator is what lets us resist self-love and prefer the greater interest of others to a small interest of our own.
From this Smith draws his standard of virtue. He separates the desire for praise from the deeper desire to be genuinely praise-worthy, and finds true satisfaction in conduct that would merit approbation whether or not it is ever seen. The book surveys the virtues of propriety, prudence, justice, and benevolence, examines how custom and fortune distort moral feeling, and reviews earlier moral philosophies, but its enduring core is the claim that conscience and moral judgment are built up socially, through sympathy and the imagined view of the impartial spectator.
Key Concepts
The capacity, through imagination, to change places in fancy with another person and feel a fainter version of what they feel; Smith broadens it beyond pity to fellow-feeling with any passion.
It is the foundation of the whole system: without this shared sentiment there would be no material for approval, disapproval, or moral judgment at all.
The fitness of a sentiment or action, measured by whether a bystander, bringing the case home to himself, can go along with it. Proper passions are those a spectator can enter into.
It gives Smith a workable test for right feeling and conduct that depends on shared human response rather than on abstract rules.
An imagined, well-informed, unbiased observer whose view we adopt to judge conduct. Propriety, merit, and demerit are all referred to what this equitable judge could approve.
It is Smith's device for correcting the distortions of self-love and partiality, supplying a standpoint fairer than our own immediate feelings.
Mental Models
To understand another's feeling, imagine yourself in their exact situation and ask what you would feel there; the resulting emotion is your sympathy with them.
It turns moral attention into an act of perspective-taking, giving a concrete method for entering experiences we do not directly share.
We cannot see our own character directly; the reactions of others act as a mirror in which we first glimpse the propriety or deformity of our own sentiments.
It explains why self-knowledge and conscience are social products, formed by watching how others respond to us.
The outward judgment of others is internalized as an impartial inner judge who reviews our conduct as a fair observer would, even when no one is watching.
It offers a way to check self-love and act well in private by appealing to a standard higher than actual praise or blame.
Selected Quotes
We examine it as we imagine an impartial spectator would examine it.
Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before.
It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct.
Source
Source text: Project Gutenberg edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith.
HTML text: https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/67363/pg67363.txt
Project Gutenberg states that this ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever.
First published 1759; the Project Gutenberg source gives an original publication of Ireland: J. Beatty and C. Jackson, 1777.