The Will to Believe is the title essay of a collection of lectures and essays in popular philosophy. James addresses a question pressed on him by the scientific temper of his age: is it ever right to hold a belief that the available evidence does not compel? His answer defends, within careful limits, a person's right to believe.
He begins by sorting the kinds of choice we face. An option is the decision between two hypotheses, and options can be living or dead, forced or avoidable, momentous or trivial. James calls an option genuine only when it is living, forced, and momentous at once. His defense of belief is meant to cover this narrow class of cases and no other.
Against the demand that we believe nothing on insufficient evidence, James argues that our passional nature already shapes what we find live or dead, credible or absurd. When a genuine option cannot be decided on intellectual grounds, telling ourselves to leave the question open is not a way of escaping risk. It is one more passional decision, and it too can cost us the truth.
He separates two commands that are often confused: seek the truth, and avoid error. A person can treat avoiding error as supreme and so stay forever in suspense, or can treat gaining truth as worth the risk of being sometimes wrong. James refuses the first policy. In moral questions, in personal relations, and in cooperative social life, he shows cases where a fact cannot arrive at all unless faith in it comes first, so that belief running ahead of proof helps create its own verification.
Finally he applies the argument to religion. The religious hypothesis, he says, claims that the best things are eternal and that we are better off believing this now. For one to whom it is a living option, religion presents a forced and momentous choice, so that scepticism is not safe neutrality but a risk of its own kind. Where the evidence cannot settle the matter, James concludes, we have the right to let our believing nature take its chance.